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Explosive Remnants of War: 
The Impact of Current Negotiations 
"While there has been significant progress in reducing the scourge of APls, 
the menace posed by unexploded artillery shells, mortar rounds, hand 
grenades, cluster bomb submunitions and other similar objects must also 
be addressed."- ICRC President Jakob Kellenberger, 2002. 1 
by Paul Ellis, 2 GICHD 
Introduction 
The 1980 UN Con ven tion o n 
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) 
has become rhe focus for new measures of 
international law on rhe issue of explosive 
remnants of war (ERW), a category char 
includes UXO and abandoned 
ammunition. The measures char have been 
and are going to be discussed could have 
major implications for the humanitarian 
impact of UXO and post-conflict 
clearance operations. 
What is the CCW? 
The fu ll ride of rhe CCW is rhe 
"Co nvention on Prohibitions or Restrictions 
on rh e Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be 
Excessive ly Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects." The Convention 
seeks to regulate the use of certain 
conventional weapons in armed conflict ro 
prevent unnecessary suffering to combatants 
and ind iscriminate harm ro civilians. 
Negoriared in 1980, ir was a by-product of 
rhe international conference of rhe 1977 
Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Convenrions.4 
T he CCW is a fran1ework instrument 
contain ing ru les on specific kinds of 
weapons. T hese rules are fou nd in fou r 
protocols rhar ban or resrricr the use of 
rhe following: weapons using non-
detectable fragments; mines, booby traps 
and other similar devices; incendiary 
weapons; and b linding laser weapons.5 
Although 90 stares are parry to rhe CCW, 
nor all States Parries have rarified rhe four 
individual protocols. This problem is 
further confused because while some stares 
have rarified rhe amendment to Protocol 
II (APJI), others have yer to do so and 
continue to follow the earl ier Protocol II. 
The CCW is an important instrument 
of international humanitarian law. lr was in 
rhe 1990s that rhe rreary became a focus for 
activity, when ir was seen as a possible vehicle 
ro reduce the impact of APLs. The Stares 
Parry to rhe CCW did negot iate an 
amendment to Protocol II, APil, which 
placed further resuicrions on landmines. 
However, the widespread disappointment 
communi ty has concentrated on alleviating 
rhe huma nitarian impact of APLs. 
However, for those operating in th e 
clearance commu nity, it is a fact rhat the 
work involves unexploded or discarded 
ordnance as much as- if nor more rhan-
ir involves landmines. The situation in Laos 
is one of rhe besr known examples.7 Nor is 
the issue of ERW new. T he authorities of 
rhe affected countries sri II regularly deal with 
munitions from rhe First and Second World 
Wars. In Po land-which was severely 
affected by ERW after the Second World 
War- as late as 1989-2000, military 
engineers cleared 3,428,290 explosive 
devices, of which only 12,620 were mines.8 
Tlmellne of the CCW Process 
with rhese modest 
measures led to the 
diplomatic drive char 
produced the Anti-
Personnel Mine Ban 
Jr was rhe air war in Kosovo, however, 
rhar led to calls for international action 
on ERW. Based on irs experiences in war-
affected areas and irs concerns about rhe 
problems caused by cluster bombs and 
ocher UXO, rhe In ternational Committee 
of rhe Red C ross (JCRC) com missioned a 
study, Explosive Remnants ofWar- Clwter 
Bombs and Landmines in Kosovo. It is worth 
quoting from t he introduction ro the 
study: "Although rhe ICRC is aware rhar 
civil ian casualties in armed conflicts are 
regrettably nor always avoidable, it believes 
rhar a large proportion of the deaths and 
injuries from explosive remnants of war in 
rhe post-conflict context is both predictable 
and preventable. This report is aimed at 
launching a dialogue among governments, 
humanitarian agencies, the mili tary, rhe mine 
clearance community and other interested 
organizations on how a dramatic reduction 
in rhe level of death and injury from rhe 
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In recent years, 
rhe in ternational 
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Concurrent with their Kosovo report, 
rhe JC RC also published a study called 
Explosive Remnants ofWar-Submunitiom 
and Other Unexploded Ordnance, which 
aimed to provide an overview of 
submunirions and their use, design and 
impact in rhe post-conflict period.10 At the 
same rime, the UK Working Group on 
Landmines11 published a report tided 
Cluster Bombs-The Military Effectiveness 
and Impact on Civilians of Clust er 
Munitions. Both organ isations called for a 
moratorium on rhe use of cluster bomb lets 
while their use, impact and legality were 
reviewed. 12 The publicat ion of these 
reports coincided with the start of rhe 
Preparatory Process fo r the Second Review 
CC W Conference in 2000. 
Based on the findings of irs report, 
rhe ICRC recommended the following: 
I. The use of cluster bombs and 
other types of subm u n i t ions agai nsr 
m il itary objectives in populated areas 
should be p rohibited, as is currently the 
case with incend iary weapons under 
Protocol I II of the CCW. 
2. Responsibility for rhe clearance of 
all UXO sho uld be assigned co rhose who 
have used them, as is currently the case 
for landmines under the terms of APII of 
rhe CCW. 
3. All necessary technical information 
concerning rhe location, dangers, detection 
and destruction of cl usrer bombs and other 
munitions should be made available to the 
United Nat ions and demining bodies 
immediately after the end ofhosriliries. 
4. Warn ing of rhe threat posed by 
ERW should be provided to rhe civilian 
population immed iately after their use in 
a given area, as is the case for remotely 
delivered land mines in APII of rhe CCW. 
5. ln order to reduce the risk to civilians 
in fun1re conflicts, cluster bomblers and other 
submunirions should be fi tted with 
mechanisms rhar will ensure rheir self-
destruction immediately after rhe device fails 
• (Left to Right) Remnants of a cluster bomb strike: unexplod ed BLU-
97 bomblets in Afghanistan. A variety of munit ions awaiting 
disposal in Afghanistan. 
to explode upon impact as designed 
6. T he use of cluster bomblers should 
be suspended until an international 
agreement on their use and clearance has 
been achieved. n 
In September 2000, the IC RC 
presented irs finding and concerns ro a 
number of stares at an experts' meeting in 
Nyon, Swirzerland. 14 T he goal o f rhe 
JCRC was to ensure rhar a discussion 
about ERW was included in rhe Second 
CCW Review Conference. '; Independent 
pressure ro ensure such a discussion also 
came from ocher non-governmental 
organisations (NG0s). 16 
The Second Review 
Conference of the CCW 
The Second Review Conference of 
rhe CCW took place in December 2001 . 
The focus of stares parry ro rhe CCW was 
divided among several topics. The main 
focus was to ensure an extension of the 
scope of application of rhe CCW to cover 
internal as well as in ternational confl icts. 
In addition ro ERW, rhere were other issues 
under consideration, including mines 
other chan APLs, measures for compliance 
and small arms. 
Overall, despite the various proposals, 
the largest parr of rhe rime was spent 
discussing rhe issue ofERW. T his was very 
much an educative process, as while some 
srares were very aware of the issue, others 
were being introduced to the issue for the 
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first time. lt was never going to be possible 
ro conclude a new agreement on ERW at 
rhe Review Conference. However, there 
was wide recogni tion of ERW as an 
important topic t hat need ed to be 
examined further. To undertake the work, 
a Group of Government Experts (GGE) 
was establ ished to discuss ways and means 
to address rhc issue of ERW.1' The group 
was to "consider all factors, appropriate 
measures and proposals, in particular: 
• Factors and types of munitions rhar 
could cause humanitarian problems after 
a confl ict; 
• Technical improvements and other 
measures fo r relevant types of munitions, 
includingsubmunitions, which could reduce 
the risk of such munitions becoming ERW; 
• The adequacy of exist in g 
internationa l humanitarian law in 
minimising post-conflict risks of ERW, 
both to civilians and to rhe military; 
• Warning ro rhe civilian population 
in or close to ERW-affecred areas, clearance 
ofERW, rhe rapid provision of information 
to facilitate early and safe clearance ofERW, 
and associated issues and responsibilities; 
• Assistance and cooperarion."18 
ERW in the CCW During 
2002 
T he GGE mer three rimes during 
2002 for a roral ofless than five weeks. In 
reality, many of the diplomatic delegations 
remained unchanged from the Second 
1
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Review Conference and few delegations 
included technical experrs in clearance. 
Stares naturally relied o n their own 
expertise, which usually consisted of a 
military officer, and sometimes a military 
e ngineer with some experien ce of 
barrlefl eld area clearance, bur nor of 
clearance for humanitarian reasons. 
The Geneva Inrernarional Cemre for 
H umanitarian Demining (GIC HD) 
participated by providing technical advice 
on rhe issues char were discussed. As part 
of rhis contribution , rh e GICHD 
published two papers. The first paper, 
ERW- A Threat Analysis, attempted to 
provide a quantitative analysis of which 
munitions were a particular problem. 19 It 
concluded that while qualitatively, rhe 
• A destroyed BM-21 in ' 
Afghanistan. 
clearance communi ty could identify the 
major problem munitions, there was 
insufficient data to provide an empirical 
anal ys is.20 The second paper, ERW-
Undesired Explosive Events in Ammunition 
Stomge Areas, p rovided an u nderstanding 
of rhe potential threat from abandoned 
am munitio n s tockpiles and poor 
ammunition management practices, which 
were areas of discussion in the GG£.1 1 
Th e UN Mine Action Service 
(UNMAS) sent the former Programme 
Manager of rh e UN M in e Action 
Programme in Kosovo to the GGE. His 
paper, presented to rhe GGE in July 2002, 
was o ne of the few written contributions 
ba sed on actual field experie nce in 
clearance; it concentrated on the issue of 
idenrifying the problem and information 
requ irements ro overcome the ERW 
problem Y Othe r contributions were also 
provided by the IC RC, Landmine Acrion, 
and Human Righrs Watch (HRW) Y 
However, the majority of working papers 
rhar were presented and discussed in the 
GGE cam e from States Parries. There has 
bee n no s hortage of material to be 
discussed, with over 30 official working 
papers presented plus a large number of 
additional p resentations on the subjects. 
Several topics were the focus of parricular 
interest, including information requirements, 
existing international humanitarian law, 
tecl1nical improvements to submunitions 
and warnings to civilians.24 The sessions, 
however, were nor designed to examine the 
minutiae of the issues or to negotiate a 
prorocol, but to examine whether measures 
ro address the problem were feasible and 
whether a new agreement should be 
negotiated . Overall, there was widespread 
recogn ition of the problems caused by ERW, 
and although the process sounds drawn our, 
many stares spoke in favour of moving 
quickly to address the issues and what 
measures might be negotiated. 
The Next Step 
At rhe Decem ber 2002 meeting of 
States Parries to rhe CCW at which the 
work of rhe GGE was discussed, it was 
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agreed that actua l negonanons on an 
instrumenr on ERW would start in March 
2003.15 T he mandate agreed on by rhe 
Stares Parries is broad. Interestingly, it stares 
rhar rhe issues of inrernarional law and 
technical improvements are to be "separate 
from the negotiations." Borh of these areas 
have proved conrenrious; rhe legal debate 
involves the p roblem of how existing 
inte rnat ional h umanitarian law and 
pro posals o n res tri cting the use of 
submunirions should be interp reted-
issues on which several influential parries 
d iffer. 26 Technical improvements, which 
have been promoted by Switzerland and rhe 
United States, have been strongly resisted 
by rhe developing coumries who are 
concerned about the cost and availability 
of such rechnology.r If a draft protocol is 
ro be negotiated, the probable focus will be 
o n sectio n (a)(i), which looks ar 
responsibility for clearance, existing ERW, 
rhe provision of information, warning to 
civil ians, assistance and cooperation. 18 
The Meeting of Stares Parties decided 
rhar rhe Working Group on Explosive 
Remnants of War would continue irs work 
in the year 2003 with the following mand..1.re: 
(a) (i) To negotiate an instrument on 
posr-con Aicr remedi al measures of a 
generic nature that would reduce the risks 
of ERW These measures would be based 
on a broad defin it io n covering most rypes 
of explosive munitions, with rhe exception 
of mines. Abandoned munitions would 
have robe included. In rhese negotiations, 
questions need to be considered regarding, 
inrer alia, responsibility for clearance, existing 
ERW, rhe provision of info rmation to 
facilitate clearance and risk ed ucation, 
warnings to civilian populations, assistance 
and cooperation, and a framework for regular 
consultations of High Contracting Parties. 
T hese negotiations would have to establish 
rhe scope of this instrument consistent wid1 
Article I of the Convemion as amended at 
irs Second Review Conference. 
(ii) To explore and determine whether 
these negotiations could successfully address 
preventive generic measures for improving 
rhe reliability of munitions that fall within 
the agreed broad d efin ition , t hrough 
voluntary best practices concern ing rhe 
management of manufacturing, quality 
control, handling and storage of munitions. 
Exchange of information , assistance and 
cooperation would be important elements 
of such best practices. 
(b) Separate from the negotiations 
under (a) ro continue to consider the 
implementation of existing principles of 
inrcrnarional humani tarian law and ro 
further srudy, o n an open-ended basis, 
possible p reventive measu res aimed at 
improving design of certain specific rypes 
of muni t io ns, including submunirions, 
wi th a view to minim ise the humanitarian 
risk of these munitions becoming ERW. 
Exchange of information, assistance and 
cooperation would be part of this work. 
(c) In the context of the activi t ies 
described above, meetings of military 
experts can be conducted to provide advice 
in support of these acriviries.19 
There was some criticism of what was 
left our. In particular, a d isagreement on 
rhe rexr led to the deletion of the explicit 
reference to victim assistance, much to the 
annoyance of several NGO s.30 The South 
African delegation stared rhar rhey would 
agree to the deletion only on the assumption 
that victim assistance would be discussed 
under assistance and cooperarionY 
The Implications for the 
M ine Action Community 
Many in the m ine clearance sector are 
not involved in the current d iplomatic 
work, perhaps in parr because of a 
perception of too many promises that have 
gone unfi ll ed. However, discussions on 
ERW will go ahead in 2003 and may 
potentially have a profound impact on 
future post-conflict clearance operations. 
For existing programmes, the impact 
is likely to be small. Ir seems un likely from 
the discussions of the last year char Stares 
Parries will agree to retrospective action, 
although this issue wiJJ be raised. The 
greates t potential is for how future 
programmes post-conflict are affected. To 
provide a theoretical example, what could 
be rhe impact o n a clearance programme 
rha r fo llowed a military attack by a 
coalition force such as occurred in Kosovo? 
To dare, nothing substantive has been 
agreed upon, bur discussions suggest the 
following may occu r: a guaranteed level 
of fund ing for clearance to achieve a pre-
define d tech n ical s tandard ; accurate 
geographic info rmation for strike points 
of munitions; a list of types and quantities 
of munitions dropped; target lisrs; funding 
for warnings to civilians both in advance 
and after the confl ict; demolition 
procedures; specialist assistance for 
particular munitions; and technical 
characteristics of munitions. All this 
information delivered in a timely fashion 
in a practical format that has been 
prescribed. C learance organ isations would 
no longer have ro ask for chis 
information- they would know what will 
be available, when, where, and in what 
fo rmat. All of which arguably would have 
a positive effect on clearance programmes. 
Further, a future Prorocol may be legally 
binding, so it would not be a question of 
whether militaries wanted to provide 
information-they would be obliged to 
under international human itarian law. 
These measures affect fundamental 
aspects of clearance programmes, whatever 
and wherever the rhrear. Such issues will 
be discussed in detail in 2003, and may 
be incorporated into international law 
shortly after the d iscussions finish. 
The GGE will see considerable debate 
d1is year. The negotiations are nor without 
d1eir challenges, the least of which is agreeing 
on a formal definition of what constitutes 
ERW Since other treaties cover landmines, 
and because of other political reasons, they 
are currendy excluded from the definition. 
Stares Parries have other concerns too, 
particularly the potential impact on military 
operational effectiveness. The financial 
implications and deciding on responsibility 
for clearance are also areas likely to see carenu 
discussions. Stares Parries are wary of 
me-Jsures that would leave them with open-
ended commitments. To field operators, the 
GGE process may seem a cumbersome, slow 
and bureaucratic process, which it is, bur it 
is currently the only mechanism available to 
conduct d1ese negotiations and achieve an 
imernarional agreement.31 
It is up to individuals and organisations 
what action they take to influence the debate. 
The GICHD is committed to producing 
papers d1at assist the d iscussions.-H Through 
our work, we hope ro help States Parries to 
decide on practical, adlievable measures. The 
States Parries are nor seeking a panacea for 
ERW Ulrimarely, the technical aspects of 
clearance programmes will remain 
unchanged. Existing programmes would 
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seem unl ikely to benefit, bur eventually the 
negotiations in 2003 could lead to many of 
d1e questions the clearance community asks 
when a conflict has occurred being answered 
automatically: Is there funding available and 
how much? What and where are the 
problems? The clearance community 
sometimes complains about the diffiCLutyof 
their work. Perhaps (he CCW offers hope 
that ir may be a li ttle-even a lot--easier in 
(he nlture . • 
• All pbotos courtesy ofVmt HoMe . 
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